TOPCISECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

44 AUG 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)


1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)




c. Major units involved in the initial assault include:

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3. Level of National Mobilization Required.



4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic


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


c. Major units involved in the initial assault include:



DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

N. Menan, National Security Council Partially Declassified/Released on (12356) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Cour 3. Level of National Mobilization Required.



4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within days.


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e. CONAD air defense capabilities in southeast United

States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air Force forces brought into the area for this operation. Therefore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is anticipated.

5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction.

- a. The military reaction will be determined in large measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency in their use, at the time of US military intervention.
- b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare.
- c. Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States. All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to guard against any such attempts at retaliation.
- d. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for counteraction will improve if Soviet's continue to provide the Cubans with additional military equipment and training.

 Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities.



d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed.

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6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation.

- a. The duration of a US military presence in Cuba is contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support a defeated Castro might receive for the conduct of residual guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an effective friendly Cuban government.
- b. Following the establishment of essential military control of the island, a substantial US military commitment may be required in Cuba for a significant period of time. Post assault tasks will include restoration of law and order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations.
- c. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above, it is planned that the post assault military presence initially will consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with such other sea and air support as may be required. This will be reduced gradually in size as the effectiveness of the new Cuban government increases. Thereafter, a lengthy period of providing military assistance is anticipated.